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Abstract
The existing empirical evidence on the relationship between apprentice-
ships, initial workplace training and economic downturns, is relatively scarce.
The bottom line of this literature is that ratio of apprentices to employees tends
to be (mildly) pro-cyclical and to decline during a recession, with the notable
exception of the Great Depression, when it rose (at least in England). When
broader measures of training are considered, which exclude apprentices, the
weight of the evidence is in favour of counter-cyclical training incidence. This
paper suggests that a possible reconciliation of these findings is based on rec-
ognizing that firms may have incentives to train incumbents during a downturn
and at the same time to reduce the recruitment and training of young employees,
who are engaged in the transition from school to work.
Keywords: apprenticeship training, economic downturns
1. Introduction
The world economy is experiencing a severe economic downturn. GDP growth is
slowing down sharply and is expected to be negative in 2009 in the US, Japan, Britain
and the Euro area. Unemployment is rising and consumer demand is falling, as the
real economy is hit by the consequences of the financial turmoil.
Recessions are times of ”cleaning up”, when outdated or unprofitable techniques
and products are dismissed and new technology is adopted (Caballero & Hammour,
1994). During recessions, the flows out of employment increase and the flows into
employment fall. The intensity of these flows vary with age: in the US, young work-
ers experience the highest increase in outflows and the highest decline in inflows. Old
workers are less likely to exit but experience a substantial decline in employment in-
flows (Blanchard & Diamond, 1990). Therefore, it is especially the young and the
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old who are negatively affected by a recession. In many European countries and
in Japan, where employment protection legislation and practices shelter permanent
employees from redundancies, the brunt of employment adjustment in the recession
falls on reducing recruitment, especially of the young (Gielen & Van Ours, 2005)1.
What is the expected effect of the economic downturn on the provision of human
capital within firms? There is no quick answer to this question. On the one hand, the
cleansing role of recessions calls for additional investment in organizational capital,
inclusive of training. On the other hand, we know that training incidence is highest
among young employees (see for instance Bassanini et al., 2007): since employment
is reduced, at least initially, by cutting on the recruitment of young workers, average
training incidence can fall in a downturn as the result of a shift in the composition of
employment towards older and more protected workers.
In answering this question, it is also important to distinguish between shallow
and severe downturns, and between short training programs, which last a week or
a month, and long programs, including apprenticeships, which could last for years.
I expect that short recessions will affect short programs more than long programs,
because the expected benefits of the latter will accrue mainly when the economy has
already recovered. On the other hand, deep recessions as well as prolonged slumps,
similar to the one experienced by Japan in the 1990s, may have broader and lasting
effects on training.
During recessions, time spent at work becomes relatively less valuable with re-
spect to time spent at school or in workplace training. Individuals and firms shift
their efforts from production to retooling their skills and updating their organiza-
tional capital. Enrolment in schools increases and training intensity, both in the
classroom and on the job, rises. With complete and perfect markets, this realloca-
tion needs not require government intervention: students can borrow more to support
higher tuition fees, schools can offer additional slots and firms can find the resources
to fund additional training. Furthermore, wages are sufficiently flexible to encourage
the recruitment of apprentices. In practice, markets are far from perfect, and gov-
ernment intervention, both in education and in training, is common. Do government
policies work? What policies should be adopted to foster the human capital of the
young? These are difficult questions, but luckily the economics literature provides
some tentative answers.
The purpose of this review is to examine the existing empirical evidence on the
relationship between economic downturns and the provision of workplace training
to young individuals. This training includes mainly apprenticeships but also short
programs - such as internships and traineeships. As defined by Ryan (2000, p. 44)
apprenticeships are ”...a formal, structured programme of vocational preparation,
sponsored by an employer, that juxtaposes part - time off the job instruction with on
the job training and work experience, leads to a recognized vocational qualification at
craft or higher levels, and takes at least two years to complete. In continental Europe,
vocational and general education form part of the package and apprenticeship is
1See also The Economist, You Are Hired - Next Year, May 2 2009, pp.60-61
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treated as part of vocational education, usually at upper secondary level”.
In most countries where apprenticeships exist, they tend to concentrate in manu-
facturing and construction. They are typically accompanied by a set of institutional
arrangements that try to resolve some of the problems associated with the scheme, in-
cluding low educational content, free riding, and under-training, and by government
intervention, both as a regulator and (often but not always) as a generous supplier
of subsidies. Table 1 at the end of this paper illustrates in a compact way some
key features of apprenticeships2. It is widely recognized that these institutions work
rather well in the countries of Continental and Nordic Europe, but are somewhat less
effective in Anglo - Saxon countries3.
The review is organized as follows: in the first Section I briefly look at the eco-
nomic theory; the empirical literature on apprentices and the business cycle is exam-
ined in Section 2. Section 3 considers other types of training, including schooling.
Section 4 is devoted to policy implications. In Section 5 I ask what data are available
to pursue further research in the area. Conclusions follow.
2. Apprenticeships and the business cycle: the theoretical arguments
A good starting point in discussing how economic downturns can affect appren-
ticeships and short - term workplace training episodes is the investment model by
Stevens (1994). This is an investment model because it views the demand for ap-
prenticeship as an investment for future production, in contrast with models which
emphasize instead the opportunity of substituting more expensive skilled labour with
less expensive apprenticeships for the purpose of current production (see Lindley,
1975).
Firms in Stevens’ model need to choose between two alternative modes of fill-
ing future skilled vacancies: hire skilled labour when the future need arises or train
unskilled young labour now in the expectation that it will be ready for future produc-
tion. This choice is affected by relative costs and benefits. If trained apprentices and
skilled labour are perfect substitutes, expected benefits are the same. Costs, however,
differ: they are training costs for apprentices and recruitment costs for skilled labour.
Training costs include the wage paid to apprentices - net of their contribution to
output during training - and the costs of training facilities, materials and trainers4.
Compared to training costs, the costs of recruiting skilled labour are only born when
recruitment occurs. If skilled labour were abundant and easy to locate and recruit
2The table was originally produced by Ryan (2000) and extended by Bassanini et al. (2007)
3See Harhoff & Kane (1997) for a discussion of the German apprenticeship system from the perspec-
tive of the US labour market
4Harhoff and Kane (1997) examine the evidence for Germany and conclude that the training costs
born by employers during the apprenticeship period are substantial. In contrast, Mühlemann et al. (2007)
show that the majority of Swiss firms manage to recoup their costs before the end of apprenticeships. This
difference is related to the higher retention rate after completion of apprenticeships in Germany than in
Switzerland, which allows training companies in the former country to recoup their training costs after
the end of apprenticeships.
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when needed, few firms would train apprentices, unless the burden of the cost of
training could be shifted to trained workers or the taxpayer. When future recruitment
is costly, however, firms may be willing to offer apprenticeship contracts if by so
doing they can produce in-house and at a lower cost the skills required by the time
the need arises, and save future recruitment costs (see also Saint Paul, 1993; Brunello
& Medio, 2001; Ryan, 2009; and the references therein).
I extend this model to examine the effects of the business cycle. Suppose that
a downturn sets in, with a negative temporary shock to current revenues, and that
apprenticeships last for a few periods. Due to the temporary nature of the shock, the
future benefits of training are unaffected, and so is the expected cost of recruiting
skilled labour in the future. Suppose also that apprentice wages are unchanged.
Then the temporary shock has two effects: on the one hand, current productivity
declines; on the other hand, if part of the training is carried out by senior workers,
their foregone production also declines. The former effect increases training costs
and the latter reduces it. If the decline in the apprentice’s productivity prevails,
training costs increase and the incentive to train now rather than hire in the future
falls.
When current output declines but future expected output is unchanged, and there
are no costs of adjusting labour, recruitments decline and redundancies of skilled and
unskilled labour take place. In this case, although in a downturn the absolute number
of apprentices may fall, the ratio of apprentices to employees can increase. When
there are substantial costs of adjusting labour, however, current employment may
be temporarily hoarded within the firm. Recruitments fall, including those of new
apprentices. In this case, the ratio of apprentices to employees can be pro-cyclically.
Compared to apprenticeships, which usually take a few years to complete, train-
ing programs of short duration are negatively affected both by the temporary reduc-
tion in the current demand for skilled labour and by the decline in the current cost of
recruiting skilled labour. Therefore, I expect that, ceteris paribus training courses of
short duration are more affected than long courses by temporary shocks.
Next consider a prolonged downturn, which affects both the current and future
periods. If the shock extends to the time when apprenticeships are expected to be
completed, there are two additional factors at play: first, future recruitment costs fall,
and hiring skilled labour from the market when the need arises becomes relatively
more convenient; second, the future scale of production is reduced, and so is the
need for skilled workers, independently of whether they are trained inside the firms
or recruited from outside. Therefore, compared to the case of a temporary shock, a
prolonged downturn is more likely to affect negatively training programs which last
several periods of time, such as apprenticeships. With a prolonged shock, labour
hoarding is a less viable option and redundancies increase. In this case, both the
numerator and the denominator of the ratio of apprentices to employees are affected
negatively and to a larger extent than in the case of a temporary shock.
An alternative to the investment model of apprenticeships is the substitution
model, which states that the relative demand for apprentices depends on output as
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well as on their wages relative to those of skilled employees. Assuming that relative
wages are not affected by a temporary downturn, the substitution hypothesis predicts
that a temporary reduction of output leads to a reduction in the number of appren-
tices and skilled labour employed by the firm, with no change in their relative share.
When skilled labour is costly to adjust, however, firms may choose to have a core of
skilled permanent labour and a periphery of temporary labour - including apprentices
- who can be hired in upswings and shed in downturns5.
So far, we have considered the decision to recruit apprentices or to offer train-
ing courses to new recruits. Yet an economic downturn affects also the training of
current employees. Since the value of foregone production declines, recessions are
times for reorganization and for the production of organizational capital (Hall, 1991).
One facet of reorganization is training: firms temporarily hoard idle employees in a
downturn and train them in the expectation that their productivity will be higher
when the next expansion returns. When labour hoarding is important, apprentice-
ship training may fall in a recession even though continuous training - which refers
to (adult) employed workers - increases.
Finally consider training episodes initiated by individuals rather than by firms.
During recessions individuals re-direct their activities away from production and
toward leisure, home production and the production of human capital. By doing so,
they take advantage of the lower foregone costs of production. If training requires
resources, however, the shift toward training during a downturn could be hampered
by the presence of liquidity constraints6.
3. Apprenticeships and the business cycle: the empirical literature
The existing empirical research on the cyclical pattern of apprenticeships and initial
workplace training covers only a few developed countries. Typically, but not always,
this evidence is based on econometric estimates that associate initial workplace train-
ing to business cycle indicators. The main findings are summarized in Table 2 at the
end of the paper. In this section, I review this evidence. In the next section, I con-
sider instead the few empirical studies which have looked at the relationship between
a broader definition of training and economic downturns.
In her empirical application of the investment model discussed in the previous
section, Stevens (1994) uses data from the British engineering industry covering the
period 1967 to 1988. The recruitment of first - year craft trainees fell considerably
in the early 1970s, in the wake of the first oil shock, recovered in the second part
of the 1970s and fell sharply again during the 1980-81 recession. Stevens is mainly
interested in the association between the ratio of apprentice recruitment to craft em-
ployment - in logs - and an index of relative skill shortages, which captures the
cost of recruiting skilled labour: the tighter the labour market the higher the cost7.
5See for instance Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) and the references therein
6Dellas and Sakellaris (2003) discuss these issues in the context of college education.
7This index is computed as the difference between the CBI (Confederation of British Industry) skill
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Her empirical results show that this association is positive. It is not clear, however,
whether her results can be taken as supportive of her theory, which suggests that
the recruitment costs that matter are not the current ones but those at the time when
apprentices are expected to have completed their training.
More interesting for the purposes of this review is the estimated relationship
between the business cycle and the ratio of apprentices to employees. A positive re-
lationship would suggest that this ratio is pro-cyclical; a negative relationship would
point instead to a counter-cyclical behaviour. In one of the empirical specifications
she presents, Stevens shows that the log ratio of apprentices to employees decreases
when: a) the CBI capacity shortage index CAPSH increases; b) the CBI index of
absolute skills shortages SKSH declines. Both indicators move pro-cyclically and
attract similar coefficients. Since the difference between SKSH and CAPSH is pro-
cyclical, this evidence suggests that the ratio of apprentices to employees declines
during downturns.
In another study using data from the British engineering industry, Hart (2005) ex-
amines how the employment of apprentices and skilled journeymen adjusted during
the years of the Great Depression. He uses data that cover 27 district associations of
the Engineering Employers Federation, 8 occupations and the period 1928 to 1938.
He estimates dynamic employment equations for apprentices, crafted journeymen
and the ratio of the two, using the current and lagged change in the district unem-
ployment rate as an indicator of business cycle conditions. He finds that: a) the
employment of both apprentices and journeymen moved pro-cyclically, but the re-
sponse of the former was delayed with respect to the latter; b) the ratio of apprentices
to journeymen moved counter-cyclically.
According to Hart, the quicker response of the employment of journeymen to
worsening labour conditions can be explained by wage rigidity, which made many
journeymen unprofitable from the outset of the recession. In the absence of em-
ployment protection measures, the sudden decline in output was met initially with
the layoff of journeymen and only in a second time with the shedding of (cheaper)
apprentices. As suggested by the investment model presented verbally in the previ-
ous section, the delayed adjustment in the number of apprentices can be interpreted
as the consequence of the fact that the decline in output was initially considered as
temporary and became prolonged only later. An alternative explanation based on
the substitution hypothesis is favoured by Hart, who argues that firms in the down-
swing preferred to retain initially experienced apprentices, who were cheaper than
the journeymen and could do most of their work.
In a third study of the UK experience, Felstead and Green (1996) examine the im-
pact on training of the recession of the early 1990s, using data from the Labour Force
Survey. In their descriptive analysis they report that the total number of apprentices
declined from 367,000 in the spring of 1989 to 312,000 in the spring of 1992, a
15 percent decline. The percentage of employees on an apprenticeship scheme was
mildly pro-cyclical, hovering around 1.5 percent, not far from the value taken in
shortage index and the CBI capacity shortage index.
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the mid to late 1980s8. Considering the severity of the recession, the decline in the
proportion of employees receiving training was a small one9.
In a recent study of apprenticeships in the US construction industry, Bilginsoy
(2003) examines how the cancellation and completion rate of apprenticeships vary
with the business cycle, measured by the state unemployment rate. In the US, appren-
ticeships have traditionally played a much smaller role in the training of labour than
in Europe, partly because the institutional arrangements required to ensure incentive
compatibility - firms don’t fail to deliver training and individuals do not quit before
the end of the training scheme - have been lacking10. Apprenticeship schemes have
survived mainly in the construction industry, and last between three to four years.
Cancellations occur when the apprentice quits the scheme; completions can vary in
duration depending for instance on the availability of training jobs.
Bilginsoy uses the data from the Apprenticeship Information Management Sys-
tem compiled by the Bureau of Apprenticeship Training, which contain information
on the apprenticeship start and exit rates and type of exit of more than 10 thousand
apprentices over the period 1989 to 1995. He estimates a competing risk model with
two hazards, the cancellation and completion hazard, which measure the probabil-
ity of leaving the stock of apprentices at a given point in time, and finds that both
cancellations and completions moved pro-cyclically, which implies that the stock of
ongoing apprentices was higher in a downturn. Cancellations decline in a downturn
because apprentices have fewer opportunities of quitting and taking up semi-skilled
jobs that pay a higher wage than apprenticeships11. Completions also decline as the
number of training jobs falls. Bilginsoy’s study is interesting because of the empha-
sis it places on the apprentice’s choice, rather in contrast with Stevens’ model, where
the key decisions are taken by profit maximizing employers12.
Evidence that the share of apprentices in total employment is pro-cyclical is pre-
sented by Askilden and Nilsen (2005) in their study of the Norwegian labour market.
Apprentices in Norway are based on the ”2+2” system, with the former two years
spent in vocational schools and the remaining years with a firm (see Kuczera et al.,
2008). Askilden and Nilsen model the demand for apprentices and adult workers
(aged 18 years or above) using a translog cost function. Under the assumption that
the cyclical variation of cost shares is dominated by quantities rather than prices,
they estimate the association between these shares and the unemployment rate, both
8See also Greenhalgh and Mavrotas (1993), who investigate the effects of the UK recession in the
early 1980s.
9In autumn 1992, Felstead and Green interviewed 157 mostly small and medium-sized employers to
understand how their training strategies changed during the 90-92 recession. They found that 43% of
respondents claimed to have increased their training activities in the last two years, while 27% reported
no change, and 25% reported cutbacks in training.
10See Elbaum (1995).
11The poaching threat is likely to fall in a downturn, which encourages the employer’s incentive to
invest.
12Additional evidence on apprenticeship registrations and completions is provided for Canada by
Sharpe, Asenault and Laponte (2008). Toner (2003) presents evidence on Australian apprenticeships
and show that they declined sharply during the recession of the early 1990s.
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current and four quarters ahead, using quarterly data collected by the Norwegian Em-
ployers’ Federation on the manufacturing and construction industries for the period
1990-1996.
They find that the employment of adult workers increase both with the cur-
rent and with the forward unemployment rate, which they interpret as evidence that
firms employ skilled labour when it is in abundant supply (the unemployment rate is
high)13. They also find that the number of apprentices is pro-cyclical and decreases
with the current and forward unemployment rate. The latter finding is consistent both
with the investment model, because a lower forward rate signals higher recruitment
costs for skilled labour, and with the substitution model, which implies that appren-
tices belong to a more flexible peripheral labour force, that increases in booms and
falls in downswings. Overall, their results imply that the ratio of apprentices to adult
workers is pro-cyclical.
Norwegian students enrolled in vocational tracks need to find a suitable slot in
firms to complete their apprenticeships. In an economic downturn, when there are
fewer vacancies, completion can take place at school, but is clearly a second best so-
lution (see Kuczera et al., 2008). Because of this, the ratio of apprentices to students
enrolled in vocational schools is likely to increase in a boom and fall in a downturn.
An admittedly gross way of exploring this aspect further is to express the ratio of
apprentices to students enrolled in upper secondary schools as follows
A
T
=
A
V
V
T
(1)
where A, T and V denote the stock of apprentices and the stock of students en-
rolled in upper secondary education and in the vocational track respectively14.
I use the data from Statistics Norway to plot in Figure 1 the ratio of apprentices
to pupils in secondary education (A/T) against the national unemployment rate dur-
ing the period 2001 to 2007: there is a clear negative relationship, with the ratio
increasing when the unemployment rate falls. At the same time, the ratio of appren-
tices to pupils in VET schools (A/V) declines and the percentage of pupils in VET
schools (V/T) increases when the unemployment rate increases (see Figure 1). This
suggests that the pattern of the A/T ratio is pro-cyclical because the increase in the
share of VET students taking up an apprenticeship in an economic upswing more
than compensates the decline in the percentage of pupils enrolling in VET tracks.
A candidate reason why the ratio V/T increases during an economic downturn
is that the percentage of school dropouts who leave vocational schools follow a pro-
cyclical pattern: when the economy is expanding, the value of time at work raises
relative to time at school and many pupils enrolled in the VET track find opportuni-
13This finding is puzzling, because employment is typically pro-cyclical; moreover, it is based on the
assumption that all adult workers are skilled.
14The number of students in upper secondary education and in vocational schools is gross of appren-
tices. In Norway, as in many other European countries, secondary education includes both vocational and
academic tracks.
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Figure 1: The apprentices / students ratio and unemployment rate in Norway
ties to work in the labour market without going through an apprenticeship15. Since
in the Norwegian system individuals who started work without completing an ap-
prenticeship are allowed to sit exams for skill certificates after a few years of work
experience, dropping out of school in an upturn to take up better paying jobs appears
to be a valid alternative to apprenticeships.
The country which has attracted international attention for the quality of its ap-
prenticeship system is Germany, with its dual system of education (see Ryan, 2001;
Culpepper, 1999; Harhoff & Kane, 1997). A similar system is implemented also in
Austria and Switzerland. A descriptive study of the effects of the recession of the
early 1990s on the German apprenticeship system was carried out by Wagner (1998).
She compared the apprentice training ratio (apprentices to employees) in 1990 and
1995 in West Germany and found that this ratio fell from 7 to 5.5 for the entire econ-
omy, from 10.9 to 8 among firms with 1 to 9 employees and from 5.2 to 4.3 among
firms with at least 500 employees. She also found that the percentage of plants doing
apprentice training declined from 28.3 to 23.7 percent during the same period. In
15The choice of leaving school to take up a job is less open to students enrolled in academic tracks,
who are typically college bound.
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the absence of a multivariate analysis, however, it is difficult to attribute this decline
to the economic downturn, because other factors could matter, including changes in
industrial composition and long term trend effects16. In contrast, Jaconebbinghaus et
al. (2008) show that the percentage of apprentices during the downturn of the early
2000 was quite stable, which they interpret as showing that German business does
not show less inclination to train apprentices during bad times.
Schweri and Mueller (2008) use Swiss firm data for the years 1995, 1998, 2001
and 2005 and find that the percentage of training firms is positively correlated to
average GDP growth in the past three years. Furthermore, they present a graphical
analysis of the correlation between the rate of GDP growth and the share of individ-
uals aged 16 who are involved in an apprenticeship. The share is pro-cyclical, in line
with the Norwegian results discussed above17. Rasmussen and Westergaard-Nielsen
(1999) study instead apprenticeships in Denmark, using data on 720 plants with ap-
prentices during the period 1980 to 1991. They find that the probability of having a
new apprentice is positively associated to the rate of new hires and negatively corre-
lated to the rate of job leavers, which points again to the pro-cyclical behaviour of
workplace training.
4. Training and the business cycle: the empirical literature
In this section, I briefly review the literature on the relationship between the business
cycle, schooling and the accumulation of workplace training, including continuous
training. The selected contributions are summarized in Table 3 at the end of the pa-
per. Sepulveda (2004) develops a real business cycle model with employment adjust-
ment costs, labour hoarding and counter-cyclical training activities. In a downturn,
the foregone production cost of training declines, labour is retained because of the
presence of adjustment costs and training occurs, much in the spirit of Hall’s model
of organizational capital (Hall, 1991)18. Sepulveda uses data from the US National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to construct a panel of individuals aged 14 to
22 in 1979, which he follows until 1998. He focuses on the incidence and intensity
of off-the-job and on-the-job training, measured in hours and net of apprenticeships,
and reports that they are weakly counter - cyclical, lead the cycle and are highly
volatile, with a standard deviation of more than 10 times that of output19.
Majmudar (2007) also uses NLSY data for the period 1979 to 1988 but finds that
the probability of receiving company training decreases when the local unemploy-
ment rate increases, which points to pro - cyclical training. This negative association,
16Culpepper (1999) argues that the decline in apprentice positions in West Germany since the 1980s is
a long-run challenge to the ”high - skill equilibrium” prevailing before.
17In a recent contribution, Mühlemann et al. (2009) use Swiss panel data for the period 1988-2004 and
find that the number of new apprenticeship contracts fall when the cantonal unemployment rate increases.
18According to the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, a
common feature of recent measures to reduce the impact of the economic downturn on European employ-
ment has been the negotiated reduction of working time balanced by increased provision of training.
19The cyclical indicator used by Sepulveda is the deviation of quarterly real GDP from trend.
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however, is only statistically significant for workers who have joined the firm since
the last wave. Majmudar motivates his results as the outcome of two countervailing
effects, with the latter dominating the former: on the one hand, labour market oppor-
tunities for trained workers are fewer in a downturn, which reduces their bargaining
power with the firm and increases the employer’s incentive to train. On the other
hand, there are many alternatives to training in a slack labour market, which induce
firms to hire rather than train.
Bassanini and Brunello (2008) study the relationship between product market
regulation and workplace training, using data for 15 European countries and 8 years
drawn from the European Labour Force Survey. They only consider individuals
aged 25 to 54, which rules out most apprenticeship episodes. They find that their
measure of training incidence - the proportion of employed individuals who received
training in the four weeks before the reference week - is negatively correlated to their
measure of the business cycle, the logarithm of worked hours filtered from trend with
the Hodrick - Prescott filter, in line with Sepulveda’s findings for the US.
Dellas and Sakellaris (2003) study the relationship between schooling and the
business cycle. Their contribution is interesting for the purposes of this review be-
cause it illustrates the key factors at play in the individual decision to invest in human
capital, either at school or in a training institution. The key trade-off here is between
the opportunity cost of training, which declines in a downturn, and ability to pay,
which is typically lower in a recession. In the absence of borrowing constraints,
human capital accumulation is counter - cyclical. However, if credit markets are im-
perfect and individuals are liquidity constrained, investment can turn pro-cyclical20.
Their empirical evidence on the pattern of college enrolment in the US shows that
enrolment is counter - cyclical, which suggests that the opportunity cost argument
prevails. Similar evidence is presented by King and Sweetman (2002) who show that
school retooling - individuals leaving the labour market to return to school - is pro
- cyclical. Notice the qualitative similarity of these results with those obtained by
Bilginsoy on apprenticeship training in the US and with our discussion of enrolment
in vocational schools in Norway.
An additional reason why young individuals tend to stay on or to enrol in school
during a downturn is that entering the labour market in a recession can have persistent
effects on employment prospects and earnings. Oreopoulos, von Watcher and Heisz
(2009) for instance, show that the initial earnings loss is substantial and fades only
after 8 to 10 years after graduation21.
In Asia, the Japanese experience is of particular interest. Japan experienced a
prolonged slump after the burst of the asset prices bubble at the end of the 1980s.
The Japanese unemployment rate increased sharply, especially among the young.
Considering the age group 20 to 24, it rose from 3.7 percent in 1990 to 8.7 percent
in 1999 (see Genda & Rebick, 2001). In spite of the slump, the so called lifetime
20Liquidity constraints are less likely when students can borrow tuition money. See for instance the
The Economist, Desperemus igitur, April 25th 2009, pp.47-48.
21See also Kahn (2006) and Baker et al. (1994).
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employment system was basically unchallenged, with permanent employees enjoy-
ing a high degree of employment protection (see Ariga et al., 2000; Kato, 2000). Its
relative share of total employment, however, declined at the expense of an increased
periphery of temporary workers, mainly young, who could not find access to the
guaranteed core. Extensive dismissals of core employees were by and large avoided,
especially during the first part of the 1990s, but the recruitment of new young work-
ers as permanent employees was drastically cut. Because many Japanese (large)
firms provide extensive training to their new permanent recruits and hire mainly if
not exclusively at well defined ports of entry, one of the effects of the slump was
the increase in the average age of permanent employees. Since training intensity
declines with age, an additional likely effect was the reduction in average training
incidence and intensity. This reduction could not be compensated by the increased
recruitment of temporary employees, because these workers typically receive less
training (see Genda & Kurosawa, 2001 and Ariga, 2006).
Notice the contrast between the Japanese experience during the slump of the
1990s and the British experience during the Great Depression described by Hart
(2005) and reviewed above. In the latter case, lack of employment protection meant
that firms in the engineering industry reduced first the number of skilled journeymen
and only in a second time the number of apprentices. In the former case, the presence
of substantial costs of adjusting permanent labour led to a drastic reduction in the
recruitment of the young in permanent jobs and to the expansion of a periphery of
temporary labour, who received less training. Because to the duration of the Japanese
slump, many young school graduates, who were unlucky enough to enter the labour
market in the early 1990s, ended up trapped in a sequence of temporary jobs, more
or less losing their chance to find their way into the core of permanent employment
when the economy eventually recovered. The economic cost in terms of foregone
opportunities to accumulate human capital has not been estimated but could have
been substantial22.
The observation that prolonged recessions could trigger the expansion of tempo-
rary contracts is not only based on the Japanese experience. In an investigation of
the Swedish slump of the early 1990s, Holmlund and Storrie (2001) argue that that
recession induced an initial decline in temporary employment, followed by a sharp
rise from the through to its end. Fixed - terms contracts were only 10 percent of
total employment in Sweden in 1990 but rose to 16 percent at the end of the decade.
A similar - and even sharper - experience was shared by Finland. Since temporary
workers are known to receive less training, one of the potential side effects of a pro-
longed slump is the permanent reduction in average training intensity associated to
a shrinking core of permanent employees and to an increased share of temporary
labour.
22Genda (2005) is a vivid description of the phenomenon of ”freeta” workers, who are trapped in a
sequence of temporary jobs.
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5. Policies
In many countries public intervention that focuses on apprenticeships is not limited
to designing formal rules, but also includes financial support. These policies are
often justified with the argument that in the absence of public intervention the market
produces less than the optimal share of apprentices23.
In the apprenticeship systems prevailing in Germany, Denmark, Austria and the
Netherlands the state pays for formal education while the firms and apprentices pay
for the training on-the-job. In some case, the state also offers additional subsidies, as
in the case of Denmark. The role of firms as financing subjects is very important in
these countries. In France firms pay an apprenticeship tax that dates back to 1925 and
is mainly used by enterprises to finance - together with the state, local communities
and professional organizations - the cost of apprentice training in the Apprenticeship
Training Centres. In other countries, for example Italy, the public contribution is
considerable and firms which offer these contracts are exempted from paying nearly
100% of payroll taxes. On the other hand, training content and quality is subject to
low monitoring (Croce, 2005).
Training policies are an important component of active labour market policies
(ALMP) in OECD countries. The OECD has developed a database on public train-
ing expenditures covering the period between 1985 and 2006. Labour market train-
ing within ALMP is divided into two categories: a) spending on vocational and
remedial training for unemployed adults; and b) training employed adults for labour
market reasons. Furthermore, youth measures include training and employment pro-
grammes targeted at the young unemployed and apprenticeship training for school
leavers (Martin & Grubb, 2001). Public training expenditure as a percentage of GDP
in 2006 ranged from below 0.1 percent in Japan and the Anglo-Saxon countries to
above 0.3 in Germany, Sweden and Finland. If I regress this expenditure on country
dummies and the first lag of the rate of growth of real GDP per capita, I obtain that
a one percent reduction in GDP growth is associated to a 3.84 percent increase in
training expenditure. Therefore, public outlays to encourage training increase when
GDP growth declines.
Do these policies work? When evaluating the effects of training policies on indi-
vidual earnings and employment prospects, one needs to consider both deadweight
losses and substitution effects. These policies might fail to substantially increase the
number of skilled employees, either because part of the financial support goes to
investments that would have been realized anyway, or because firms may substitute
workers who are not affected with the recipients of training policies. In the case of
deadweight losses, both the efficiency and the equity arguments usually employed
to back up policies are undermined, since the final beneficiary of the subsidy is not
the worker, but the employer, who would have delivered the training even without
the public policy. Substitution effects may be particularly relevant in an economic
23As discussed in some detail by Bassanini et al. (2007) the empirical evidence supporting the under-
investment hypothesis is far from convincing.
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downturn, because additional subsidies paid out to firms to hire apprentices may re-
duce employment opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled labour not targeted by
the policy.
In a recent evaluation of a tax relief policy used in The Netherlands to encour-
age firms to invest in the training of workers aged 40 years or older, Leuven and
Oosterbeek (2004) find no evidence of additional training, but substitution across
ages. While this study does not explicitly consider apprenticeships, it suggests that
substitution effects across different groups of employees are important. In a study
of Switzerland, Muellemann et al. (2009), argue that unnecessary deadweight losses
can be avoided is subsidies could only be targeted to non - training firms. In this case,
the economic cost would be rather modest. If, however, the exclusion of training
firms is not feasible, the public cost of creating additional training positions would
be very high.
There is a large literature which evaluates the effects of labour market pro-
grammes, including training. Heckman et al. (1999) review this literature and con-
clude that training policies have limited impact, with partial exception for European
countries, where the effects on the probability of employment appear to be more
favourable. Martin and Grubb, 2001, also examine this literature and conclude that
the evaluation of public training programmes in the OECD suggests a mixed track
record: some programmes work, mainly for adult women24, but other programmes
don’t work, especially for disadvantaged youth. In most cases the estimated gain
involves employment opportunities. Card et al. (2009) produce a meta analysis of
existing studies and conclude that on the job and classroom training programmes are
not favourable in the short run (1 year) but have a relatively better impact after two
years25. Short run effects could even be negative because of the presence of lock-in
effects: program participants reduce their search intensity relative to non participants
during training.
Lechner and Wunsch (2006) ask whether training policies are more effective in a
downturn, when they can be argued to be needed most. Using German data that track
different policies for close to ten years, they find that the negative lock-in effects are
smaller and the positive long-run effects are larger in times of high unemployment.
In the current recession, policy proposals to combat the current recession empha-
size additional investment in education and training. President Obama’s 2010 budget
plan submitted to the US Congress, for instance, includes significant increases in ed-
ucation funding. The German recovery plan for 2009 devotes 6.5 millions Euros
for investment in infrastructure of schools and universities. The OECD (2009) sug-
24On a similar line, Kluve (2006) argues that treatment effect estimates are negative in a few cases, and
often insignificant or modestly positive. Still - he writes - there are several indicators that training pro-
grammes do increase participants’ post-treatment employment probability, in particular for participants
with better labour market prospects and for women.
25An interesting example in the current context is the labour market training policy implemented by
local authorities in Finland during the sharp downturn of the early 1990s. Natti et al. (2000) evaluate this
policy and finds that it had positive employment effects during the three years following its implementa-
tion.
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gests that growth-enhancing structural policies can be useful also to promote short
term growth26. Two such policies are infrastructure projects that improve the qual-
ity of existing infrastructure, particularly in education, and increasing expenditure
on active labour market policies to ”... provide workers with the skills that will be
needed as the economy recovers, including through the use of compulsory training
programmes” (OECD, 2009, p.19).
In the light or the mixed results reviewed above, the design of training policies
seems to be particularly important to enhance their effectiveness. Martin and Grubb
(2001) propose that the following four criteria should be met: 1) tight targeting on
participants; 2) programmes should be kept relatively small in scale; 3) they should
result in a qualification or certificate that is recognized and valued by the market;
4) programmes should have a strong on the job component in the programme, and
therefore establish strong links with local employers.
In some countries, including Denmark, Germany and Norway, the government
tries to compensate for the decline in the number of apprentice positions - for in-
stance due to an economic downturn - by allowing pupils to complete their appren-
ticeship in a vocational school. Is this a sensible policy? Given the high persistent
costs of entering the labour market during a recession without having completed up-
per secondary education, I am inclined to give a positive answer. Is this policy more
effective than paying subsidies to employers who offer additional apprenticeships?
Rasmussen and Westergaard-Nielsen (1999) estimate the impact of the Danish sub-
sidy paid out to firms who take up apprentices. This subsidy was introduced in the
late 1970s, reduced in size in 1986 and finally discontinued in the 1990s. They use a
longitudinal panel of Danish firms spanning the years 1980 to 1991 and find that the
subsidy has had an impact on the supply of apprentice positions only in some indus-
tries. They estimate that in the affected industries the demand for apprentices would
have been 7% smaller in the absence of the subsidy. They also estimate that the cost
to the public purse of a newly created apprenticeship is high, but still considerably
lower than the estimated cost of having pupils spend an additional year in vocational
schools. They conclude that paying subsidies is more cost effective that offering
public places in schools. One problem with subsidies is cream skimming by private
employers and the possibility that the less talented and motivated youngsters - who
cannot complete their education - are excluded. Another problem is that the pres-
ence of generous subsidies may induce firms to use apprentices to fill in unskilled or
semi-skilled positions, where little training is involved.
A lesson one can draw from the Danish study is that governments already pressed
with alternative uses of resources in a downturn may turn to additional subsidies if
this helps reducing the number of pupils who complete their courses in vocational
schools. Unless the training activity of firms is adequately monitored, however, re-
sults may be disappointing and the consequences of substitution effects may add to
the public burden in terms of higher unemployment insurance and social assistance.
Policy intervention that encourages training - both on the job and off the job - is
26See also the article by Holzer (2009).
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perhaps more urgent in a prolonged than in temporary downturn, because of the risk
that the young who are hit by the recession are precluded from finding a permanent
job, which provides adequate training opportunities. The Japanese experience of the
1990s suggests that the risk of being trapped in a sequence of temporary jobs with
little training is serious, with permanent consequences on individual human capital
and wellbeing. At least in part, this risk is closely intertwined with the presence
of generous employment protection for the core of senior permanent employees.
Bassanini et al. (2007) in their study of training in Europe find that average training
incidence is negatively affected both by the diffusion of temporary contracts and by
the presence of employment protection for regular workers.
The current downturn is accompanied by a sharp reduction in trade flows and
by emerging risks of protectionist policies. Policies that limit competition in the
product market could damage training. Bassanini and Brunello (2008) estimate the
effects of product market deregulation and increased competition in Europe on train-
ing incidence and conclude that the estimated effects are significant: depending on
the selected measure of regulation and on the empirical specification, a 10 percent
increase of regulation reduces training incidence in the exposed industries by 2.8
to 5 percent. The lesson one can draw from this is that training policies are not
necessarily the only and perhaps not the best tool available to support training in a
prolonged downturn: structural policies that favour product market competition and
labour market policies that reduce the dualism between protected insiders and unpro-
tected outsiders may deliver better payoffs than subsidies to workers and employers,
which are plagued by the presence of deadweight and substitution effects.
6. Potential empirical research in the area
In Europe, international harmonized surveys that cover several countries and have
information on training include the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS), the Eu-
ropean Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the European Labour Costs Survey
(ELCS). The first and the third are repeated cross sections, the second is a panel; the
former two are household surveys and the latter is an employer survey.
The European Labour Force Survey contains information on training and indi-
vidual characteristics such as age, gender, education, labour market status, part time
/ full time employment, occupation, industry. There are 23 countries in the waves
covering the period from 1992 to 2002. Additional countries have been added af-
terwards, mainly from Eastern Europe, and the definition of many key variables has
been changed, making it difficult to use these data until the late 2000s. The sur-
vey asks individuals whether they have been in education or training during the four
weeks before the interview. This relatively short period of recall reduces the risk of
recollection errors at the price of omitting training spells which have ended before
the period of reference.
For those who give an affirmative answer, additional questions on the duration
and type of training are asked. In particular, there is a question which potentially
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allows one to distinguish between initial education or training and continuous vo-
cational training. Unfortunately, this question has been re-framed in 1998, which
reduces comparability over time. Moreover, there are many missing values (espe-
cially in Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal). On top of this, the question does not
allow to distinguish between education and training, which is especially problematic
for the very young who are not employed. The 11 years covering the period 1992-
2002 include both the end of the recession of the early 1990s and the downturn of
the early 2000s. If we proxy the phase of the business cycle with the unemployment
rate, additional variation can be obtained by focusing on the region of residence, and
by comparing regions with high and low unemployment. In spite of its limits, these
data can be used to study how training incidence in the young age group vary with
economic conditions in a relatively broad group of countries and to investigate what
role different institutions can play in changing the shape of the relationship between
training and the cycle.
The European Community Household Panel is a household longitudinal survey
which includes labour market information on European individuals aged 16 or older.
Individuals participating to the survey are asked whether they have been in education
or training since January of the year before the interview. Those who give an affir-
mative answer are then asked to indicate the type of the vocational education course,
and the list of available answers include: third level qualification, such as technical
college; specific vocational training at a vocational school or college; specific voca-
tional training within a system providing both work experience and a complementary
instruction elsewhere; specific vocational training in a working environment. Unfor-
tunately, the number of missing observations is relevant for countries such as the
United Kingdom, Austria, Finland and Sweden. Additional questions are also asked
on the duration of the relevant course (typically the last). A problem with these data
is that they cover the years 1994 to 2001, a period of almost continuous economic ex-
pansion. As in the case of the survey ELFS, one can try to exploit the cross-regional
variation in economic conditions, see Majumdar, 2007, for the United States.
The European Labour Costs Survey is an employer survey that has been carried
out every four years from 1984 to 2004, and covers the core of the European Union
plus some Nordic and Eastern European countries. Its renewed version will be on
a quarterly basis. These data have information on the number of apprentices and
trainees by industry and firm size. Starting with the 2004 wave, they also include
information on training costs, which consist of the wages and salaries of trainees and
apprentices. Assuming that the survey is carried out regularly in the future, it will be
useful to investigate how training costs have been affected by the current recession.
National labour force surveys have the type of information already described
in the case of the survey ELFS. The US Current Population Survey, for instance,
includes a relevant question on training (”At any time last year, did you attend a
training program to learn specific job skills, such as computer word processing, auto
mechanics, nursing, providing child care, or a skill for some other job or vocation?”).
Household surveys with a longitudinal structure contain information on education
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and training over a relatively long period of time. Given the length of time covered
and the wealth of information, these data can be particularly useful to study how
economic downturns affect initial training targeted at young individuals. Examples
include the German SOEP (Socio-Economic Panel) and the British BHPS (British
Household Panel Survey). The former covers the period 1984 to 2006 for West
Germany, and 1992 to 2006 for unified Germany. The latter runs yearly from 1993.
These datasets have information on current education and training, labour market
status, occupation and earnings. The German panel, for instance, asks interviewed
individuals aged 16 or older who belong to the selected panel of households whether
they are currently in some sort of education, and if yes, investigates the type of
education, including apprenticeships. To my knowledge, both datasets have not been
used so far to investigate the relationship between training and economic downturns.
7. Concluding remarks
The existing empirical evidence on the relationship between apprenticeships, initial
workplace training and economic downturns, is relatively scarce and limited mainly
to Anglo - Saxon and Nordic countries. We know relatively little about the countries
of continental Europe, where the apprenticeship system is widespread and widely
admired (Germany, Austria, Switzerland). There is also need to cover other coun-
tries, especially those in Southern Europe and Asia. We have limited information
on how training costs - mainly apprentice wages - react to economic slumps, and on
whether the relationship between initial workplace training and the cycle varies by
sector and with firm size and is affected by labour and product market institutions.
In spite of the paucity of empirical research, there is a broad perception that the
provision of training is negatively affected by a recession. If one looks at the total
number of trainees or apprentices, this could be simply due to the fact that employ-
ment falls in an economic downswing. If one focuses instead on the percentage of
employees who receive training, the empirical evidence discussed above does not
provide a clear picture. Most of the reviewed studies that consider apprenticeships
suggest that the ratio of apprentices to employees is pro-cyclical and declines during
a recession. The few studies that focus on broader measures of training and exclude
apprentices, however, point to a counter-cyclical behaviour, with training incidence
that increases during a downturn.
One way to reconcile the existing evidence is to distinguish between young
labour market entrants and incumbent employees. Since the latter have accumulated
valuable firm specific human capital, firms are often reluctant to lose their skills be-
cause of a temporary downturn and tend to engage in some form of labour hoarding,
which includes the provision of training. Because of this, the training of incum-
bents could increase in a downturn. At the same time, firms also reduce recruitments
of new employees, and thereby offer fewer apprenticeships. Hence, young labour
market entrants in a downturn are more likely to be unemployed or to end up in
temporary jobs, which offer limited training. For this age group, training falls.
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The retention of incumbent insiders and the reduced recruitment of young out-
siders are clearly affected by the nature of the downturn - whether it is temporary or
prolonged - and by labour market institutions. For instance, these practices are more
likely to be observed in countries where the employment protection of incumbents
is stronger, and less likely when regulation is limited, as it was during the Great De-
pression. Other potentially relevant institutions that can impact on training incidence
include labour unions, bargaining frameworks and product market regulation. There
is evidence that some of these institutions affect training (see Bassanini et al., 2007,
and the references therein), but no evidence that they affect the relationship between
training and economic downturns.
Training policies are an important component of active labour market policies in
the OECD countries and a potential tool to address the decline in the accumulation
of human capital which could take place in a downturn. In spite of their diffusion,
the empirical evidence on their efficacy is mixed: they often don’t work, and if they
work they do so in the medium term by affecting employment probabilities. Some
commentators have concluded from this not that these policies should be abandoned,
but that they should be accurately designed to improve their effects. Yet training
policies are not the only tool available to foster the accumulation of human capital
within firms: more structural policies, which affect product market regulation and
labour market institutions, can also help.
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